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ABSTRACT
A large register based Finnish income panel data with detailed information on the 
composition of income over a 14 year time period, 1995–2008 is used to examine Finnish 
income mobility and income risk. This paper first considers measures of income mobility 
which are based on the degree of inequality (Gini coefficient) reduction over time (Shorrocks 
1978). Mobility in disposable income is decreasing with age, and with a further drop near 
retirement age. One observes a decrease in income mobility if the late 1990’s are compared 
with 2000’s. Permanent income inequality has increased in five year cumulated disposable 
incomes but not in factor incomes. If mobility is measured in absolute terms, there is little 
change, and the decrease in income mobility seems to be related to the rise in the inequality 
in cumulated incomes. 
In estimating relative risk premiums in average income, the education level, socio-
economic status and age are controlled for. Old age people have more stable incomes but 
contrary to conventional wisdom are exposed to some income risk. The paper presents 
estimates on the redistribution effect by age using differences between Gini coefficients of 
equivalised factor and disposable household income. Certainty equivalent income concepts 
are utilised to get some information on redistribution of risk. Young adults, 15–29 years 
old and elderly near retirement age 55–59 years old, seem to benefit most from implicit 
income insurance by public sector. But all age groups, including old age people gain from 
redistribution in certainty equivalent income relative to unadjusted redistribution of cash. 
Finding reduced income redistribution over the sample period is robust to a particular value 
of the degree of risk aversion assumed. It seems safe to conclude that the observed decrease 
in mobility in disposable household income which is attributed to reduced redistribution and 
could have shown as lowered income risk has not off-set the decrease in redistribution in 
cash. The results suggest that distribution of lifetime income has widened.
Key words: income mobility, risk-premium, inequality, redistribution, age
JEL classification: D31, D63, H24, H55, I31, J14
ABSTRAKTI
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan laajan, rekisteripohjaisen tulopaneeliaineiston avulla ikäryhmit-
täistä tuloliikkuvuutta ja tuloriskejä vuosina 1995–2008. Aineisto sisältää tietoja tulojen ra-
kenteesta, omaisuus- ja palkkatuloista ja muista, uudelleenjakoon vaikuttavista tulonlähteis-
tä, julkista tulonsiirroista ja maksetuista veroista. Tutkimuksessa tuloliikkuvuuden mittaa-
minen perustuu siihen, missä määrin tuloerot pienenevät (Gini-kerroin), kun mittaus käyttää 
pidemmän aikavälin tuloja eikä vuosittaisia tietoja (Shorrocks 1978). Käytettävissä tuloissa 
mitattu (suhteellinen) tuloliikkuvuus vähenee iän myötä ja siinä on selvä alenema eläkkeel-
le siirtymisen yhteydessä. Tuloliikkuvuus on vähentynyt 2000-luvulla aiemmasta. Käytettä-
vissä olevissa tuloissa mitatut tuloerot ovat kasvaneet pidempiaikaisia (viiden vuoden kes-
ki-) tuloja tarkasteltaessa. Tuotannontekijätulojen osalta tällaista muutosta ei Suomessa ole 
ollut. Jos tuloliikkuvuutta tarkastellaan suhteellisen mitan sijaan absoluuttisena, käy ilmi, et-
tä suhteellisena havaittu muutos liittyy pidemmän aikavälin tuloerojen kasvuun eikä abso-
luuttisena mitatussa arvossa näy muutosta. 
Tutkimuksessa estimoidaan kotitalouksien suhteellisia tuloriskejä vakioimalla koulutus-
tason, sosio-ekonomisen aseman ja iän vaikutus. Vanhuuseläkkeellä olevilla on muita ikä-
ryhmiä vakaammat tulot, mutta myös he kohtaavat tuloepävarmuuteen liittyviä riskejä. Li-
säksi tutkimuksessa arvioidaan ikäryhmittäin tulojen uudelleenjakoa. Tässä mittarina ovat 
(ekvivalenttien) tuotannontekijätulojen ja käytettävissä olevien tulojen Gini-kertoimien ero-
tukset. Riskipreemiolla korjattuja tuloja käyttäen saadaan samalla arvioita tuloriskien uudel-
leenjaosta. Nuoret aikuiset, 15–29-vuotiaat ja ikääntyvät, 55–59-vuotiaat, näyttävät hyöty-
vän eniten julkisen sektorin implisiittisestä tulovakuutuksesta. Mutta myös muut ikäryhmät 
saavat lisähyötyä tästä tulovakuutuksesta, verrattaessa tuloksia konventionaaliseen rahassa 
mitattuun uudelleenjakoon. Kokonaisuudessaan tulojen uudelleenjako on heikentynyt tar-
kasteluperiodin aikana, ja tulos on riippumaton siitä, mitä oletusarvoja riskiaversioparamet-
rista käytetään. Vaikka tuloliikkuvuuden alentuma olisi voinut pienentää tuloriskiä ja vaikut-
taa näin riskivakioituun tuloon, niin muutos tulojen uudelleenjaossa dominoi tätä vaikutusta 
riskivakioituihin käytettävissä oleviin tuloihin perustuvaan toimeentulon jakaumaan. Tulok-
set viittaavat siihen, että elinkaarituloissa mitatut tuloerot ovat kasvaneet. 
Asiasanat: tuloliikkuvuus, riskipreemiot, tuloerot, uudelleenjako ja ikä
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1	 Introduction
Since early 1980s there has been widening annual income inequality in the United States and 
in the United Kingdom. In some other countries, such as Germany and Japan, the increase 
up to the early 1990s has been more modest, and Canada, France and Italy show no overall 
rise over the same period (Atkinson 2000). In addition, there has been surge in top incomes 
in some countries over the last 10–20 years. At the other end of the income distribution 
it has been documented that relative poverty rates have increased during the same time 
period as the top incomes have soared. Top incomes have been most affected in Anglo-
Saxon countries, including USA, UK and Canada while in Europe Netherlands, France and 
Switzerland display hardly any change in top income shares (Atkinson & Piketty 2007). 
In Finland annual income inequality rose significantly during the latter part of the 1990s 
(Riihelä et al. 2001). The period of major income equalization from mid 1960s to the mid 
1990s has been reversed, taking the values of the Gini coefficient to levels of inequality 
found 40 years ago.1 
As the widening income inequality has entered policy discussions, it is often argued that 
policy-makers should direct more attention towards information about mobility patterns than 
cross-sectional measures of income inequality. The reasoning is based on the equalization 
argument: if increased annual income inequality is associated with increased income 
mobility, it is possible that inequality of income measured over several years has fallen.2 
Measuring economic mobility gives information about short term changes of individuals 
moving in the income distribution. The question, what income mobility is, and how it 
should be measured, has been given many interpretations in the literature (see Fields 2008, 
2010). There is no consensus on how income mobility should be measured. A great variety 
of aspects and different methods involved in mobility studies are considered in Fields & 
Ok (1999). First, there exist alternative measurement scales, change in income ranks or in 
actual income; absolute or relative change. Second, one may weight the possible directions 
of income change (up vs. down) differently, or emphasise particular status in the income 
distribution, e.g. poverty. Last, one can have several choices for the reference (status quo) 
point for mobility measurement. In this paper the average over a time span is used as a 
reference point, but it has alternatives. One may be based on the current income vs. future 
incomes, another reference may be based on a more sophisticated prediction of future 
incomes (possibly with a deterministic or stochastic trend) than the simple average, which 
is used in this paper. The choices are reflected in a number of studies addressing income 
1 Observing the rise of mega-incomes for the very top earners in the US, Piketty & Saez (2003) conclude that “the 
coupon-clipping rentiers have been overtaken by the working rich”. In Finland the opposite seems true. The decline 
in income tax progressivity since the mid 1990s and the unprecedented increase in the share of property income are 
important factors explaining both the increase in income inequality and top income shares in Finland in the late 1990s 
(Riihelä et al. 2008). In Finland, the 1993 tax reform, introducing the Nordic dual income tax model, created strong 
incentives to shift labour income to property income for those in the highest marginal tax brackets (Lindhe et al. 2004; 
Pirttilä & Selin 2006). The Finnish experience shows how changes in public policy instruments, taxation of capital, may 
have important effects on the income distributions.
2 In Finland income mobility has been studied previously by Riihelä & Sullström (2002) with two-year rotating panel 
survey data. More recently, Suoniemi & Rantala (2010) have used a similar register-based income panel data, in 1995–
2004, as in the present paper.
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mobility from different angles. Jenkins (2011) is an excellent monograph which offers a 
thoughtful and careful empirical treatment of most aspects in British income mobility.
In a given year, people may have incomes which are transitorily high or low for reasons 
such as unemployment, illness, youth, good or bad luck, or exceptional economic events. 
One of the primary motivations for economic mobility studies is to measure the extent to 
which longer-term incomes are distributed more or less equally than incomes in a single 
year. Shorrocks (1978) has emphasised: “Mobility is regarded as the degree to which 
equalization occurs as the period is extended. This view captures the prime importance of 
mobility for economists.” Krugman (1992) adds: “If income mobility were very high, the 
degree of inequality in any given year would be unimportant, because the distribution of 
lifetime income would be very even.” In contrast, a society with a rigid income distribution 
where everybody stays in the same position year after year is commonly regarded as inferior 
to a more mobile society, see Friedman (1962). An increase in income mobility tends to 
reduce inequality in lifetime income relative to that in a single period and is an indication 
that the economy is performing better. 
Therefore, annual income distributions may give an incomplete and sometimes even 
distorted picture of longer-term economic well-being. Similarly, the recent rise in income 
inequality would be of less importance if it had been accompanied with a rise in mobility. 
One should first take into account the role of income mobility in the recent rise in annual 
income inequality before the rivalling hypothesis on the explanations to the rise in inequality 
and its economic consequences are considered.3 For example, to seriously evaluate the 
various, multi-faceted hypotheses on the relationship between economic growth and income 
inequality, one should be careful enough to specify whether one should measure annual, 
possibly transitory, change in inequality or the change measured over a longer (possibly life 
long) time span (on these hypothesis, see Aghion et al. 1999 and Brandolini & Rossi 1998). 
More generally, income mobility may be viewed as a coin with two sides. On one hand, 
mobility may reduce long term inequality. On the other hand, mobility means fluctuations 
in individual incomes. The shift in assessment from annual to multi-period inequality means 
that future uncertainty about incomes must be accounted for in the evaluation (Creedy & 
Wilhelm 2002). Faced with less than perfect capital markets, forward-looking risk-averse 
economic agents view rise in income fluctuations as an increase in income risk which lowers 
economic well-being in comparison with a steady flow of income. Therefore, interest in 
mobility also raises the issue of predictability, or uncertainty. Uncertainty related to income 
fluctuations is a key dimension of income mobility. A completely mobile society would 
mean complete economic insecurity.
3 Among the hypotheses about the causes of these changes are the shift from manufacturing to service production, 
technological change, and expanding international trade and finance. To take an example, skill biased technological 
change, particularly in the advent of computerised technologies, has shifted labour demand in favour of relatively high 
skilled and more educated workers and has driven up the wages (employment) of the higher skilled and driven down 
those of the lower skilled (see Atkinson 2000, for exposition and criticism of this explanation). However, the income 
increase is highly concentrated among the very highest earners (Atkinson & Piketty 2007). The theory is not able to explain 
the rise of working rich. Instead, Piketty & Saez (2003) give a central role to taxation, executive compensation and shocks 
to capital returns and argue that changing social norms and power are important factors in explaining the recent increase 
in income inequality and top income shares.
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Inequality has many dimensions, wages, earnings, income and final consumption. 
Variability in, say, wages, is mediated by multiple mechanisms of self-insurance. First, the 
household can adjust supply of working hours. Second, joint earnings of the household 
are affected by public policies, progressive taxation, social insurance and transfers. Third, 
informal contracts and voluntary gifts between households lend added insurance. Fourth, 
the household can draw on their accumulated assets to temporarily finance consumption. 
Furthest in line are partial adjustments in replacements of durable goods and semi-durables. 
The last mechanism is particularly relevant for poor households often in the absence of 
simple credit market. 
What is the extent of Finnish income mobility? Has there been a change in mobility 
as annual income inequality has increased, and has the income risk been affected? How 
much do families need insurance against adverse shocks? How much income insurance does 
government achieve? Are individuals of different age in the same situation? Are pensioners 
a special case? The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how income panel data can be used 
to answer these and similar questions. Since there is no available data on consumption, this 
paper confines to analysing that part of income smoothing which is affected by the two first 
mechanism of self-insurance (see also Carroll 1994, Carroll & Samwick 1998, and Hoynes 
& Luttner 2011).
We examine the dynamic income process of three different time periods in Finland, 
1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004 –2008 with a large panel data set. First, the equalization 
effect of income mobility in the three time periods is discussed and their age profiles are 
examined. Second, long-term income inequality in the three time periods is evaluated by 
using the Gini-coefficient in permanent income (average over the relevant time period). 
The possible equalization effect of mobility is counteracted by risk aversion to random 
income fluctuations. The last part of the examination, role of income uncertainty, is tackled 
by comparing average income with an estimate of certainty equivalent income which has 
been risk-adjusted, and comparing their distributions. The method used is a simple and 
straight-forward one, and should be considered as a first step in the analysis. Creedy & 
Wilhelm (2002) and Creedy et al. (2011) come closest to the current paper in their method 
of taking (ex-ante) income uncertainty into account. In Creedy et al. (2011) the identification 
of the contribution of uncertainty is based on comparing actual incomes with estimates for 
predicted income of each individual, assigning their difference as a measure of uncertainty. 
The estimations are based on an autoregressive model of log-income which allows, under 
log-normality, for closed form expressions for predicted income and values of Atkinson 
index for inequality.4
Finally, this paper presents measures of redistribution of income and income insurance 
by public tax-and-transfer programs, using the difference between the Gini coefficients 
of factor and disposable equivalised household income. Differences between certainty 
equivalent income concepts are used to get some useful information on redistribution of risk 
4 Atkinson index is of the same functional form as the constant relative risk-averse utility function which is used to 
calculate relative risk premiums in the current paper. One could have followed their approach in choosing the measure 
of inequality to be of the same functional form and proceeding to decomposing inequality along the lines in their paper. 
Instead the paper chooses the Gini-coefficient (and the underlying implicit social objective function), a robust measure of 
inequality. 
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(an additional indicator of implicit income insurance), and may be considered as adding to 
the literature. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the mobility index (Shorrocks 
1978) and the inequality measure used in this paper, the Gini coefficient, and the indicator of 
risk-aversion, the relative risk premium. The data are discussed in Section 3. The empirical 
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses and concludes.
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2	 Methods
This section briefly presents the methods introduced by Shorrocks (1978) to consider 
income mobility as source of equalization of longer term (permanent) income inequality. 
By these methods income inequality (income variation) over a given observation period can 
be conveniently decomposed into two parts: the first part corresponding to income mobility 
over the observation period and the second part corresponding to inequality of longer term 
average incomes. 
On the other hand, variability in individual income introduces a welfare cost to 
households with risk-averse preferences, if there are capital markets constraints or other 
constraints which prevent the individual from smoothing out consumption over time. 
When individuals are averse towards income fluctuations over time, the equalising effect 
of mobility on longer-term income should be controlled for income risk. By focusing on the 
distribution of longer-term average income which has been risk-adjusted with an estimated 
risk premium, one may take a first step in solving the problem, how to separate income risk 
from the income mobility as an equalizer of longer term income. 
Shorrocks (1978) considers income mobility as a source of equalization of longer term 
income inequality as the observation period is lengthened. For Shorrocks, mobility is the 
opposite of rigidity (stability), defined as follows. For the case of T annual observations on 
income, the rigidity index compares the inequality of the mean income with the inequality of 
single-period incomes. Let y
it
 denote the income of individual i at time t and y
t
, t = 1,…, T, be 
the vector of annual incomes in the population. Similarly, let  be the mean 
income received by individual i over T periods, and  the corresponding vector. Let I(.) be 
an inequality measure which is a convex function of relative incomes, i.e. scale invariant. 
Shorrocks’s rigidity index has in the numerator the inequality of T-period cumulated mean 
income, and in the denominator a weighted average of the inequality in each year, with the 
weights equal to the ratio of the mean income in that year to the mean income over T years, 
  
  
   .   (1)
Shorrocks’s mobility index is then  Both R
T
 and M
T
 are bounded in the zero-
one interval, since by convexity  Mobility index which is dependent on 
length of the time horizon, T, gives the degree of income equalization as measured by mean 
income relative to annual income. For example, R
5
 equals 0.80 (M
5
 = 0.20) indicates that 80 
percent of the average annual level of inequality persists over a five year observation period, 
or alternatively that income inequality decreases by 20 percent when income is cumulated 
over five years.
Naturally, the mobility index is dependent on which underlying measure of income 
inequality is used. Different measures of income inequality weight the underlying income 
distributions differently, and corresponding mobility indices summarize the contributions 
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of individual income movements differently according to their position in the distribution. 
Suoniemi & Rantala (2010) present an extensive comparison of mobility indices using the 
Theil entropy measure and the coefficient of variation squared with those using the Gini 
coefficient.
 The Gini coefficient is the most extensively used summary measure of inequality. 
Commonly, the Gini coefficient is defined as twice the area bounded by the Lorenz curve and 
the unit diagonal. But it can be written in the following alternative form, directly showing 
that the Gini coefficient is less sensitive than other indices to observations in the tails of the 
distribution:
	 	 	 G(y)	=	1	–	(2/µ)Ey(1-F)	=	(1/2µ)E	|y
1
	-	y
2
|,	 (2)
where E refers to the expectation (mean) operator, F is the cumulative distribution function 
of the income distribution considered, µ denotes the mean income, and in the last equality 
y
i
	,	i	=	1,2 refer to two independent copies of a random variable with distribution F. 
The last mean-difference representation of the Gini is a most useful one. It gives the Gini 
coefficient as the mean of relative income differences in the population, if one introduces a 
conditional expectation
 
	 	 	 G(y)	=	(1/µ)	E	(y
1
	-	y
2
	|		y
1
	≥	y
2
	).     (3)
The Gini coefficient has several desirable properties.5 For example the Gini coefficient is 
decomposable by income sources (Lerman & Yitzhaki 1985). 
Below the emphasis from equalization of longer term income inequality is shifted to 
inequality of longer term certainty equivalent incomes which will be controlled for the 
undesirable effects of income fluctuations over time. 
Assume that households have risk-averse preferences. They maximise a weighted 
sum, , with discount factor β, β	≤	1,	under an inter-temporal budget constraint, 
 for assets, A
t
 income, y
t
 and consumption,  . Let the utility 
function to be of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form,   if 
 and  if  Above  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Suppose that consumption is distributed randomly with a multiplicative shock X around a 
level  The equivalent risk premium (ERP) is defined by the amount ψ such that
    (4)
The equivalent risk premium is the monetary value which household would be willing to 
forgo from the certain level  and still be as well off as with the random consumption flow, 
5 The Gini coefficient which is based on absolute values of income differences gives little weight to income changes 
in the tails of the distribution. Cumulating income over time will most effectively smooth incomes which are temporarily 
high or low and has less effect for relative incomes in the middle of the distribution. The robustness property of the Gini 
coefficient is often seen as a justification for preferring it to other income measures if only annual data are available since 
figures for the Gini coefficient will have less upward bias than the annual figures for other inequality measures (Shorrocks 
1980). In the current case relying on the Gini coefficient in evaluating the distribution of risk-adjusted, certainty equivalent 
incomes has for robustness reasons special merit. 
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 For empirical studies a scale-less measure of relative risk premium is more useful, 
such as given by the relative equivalent risk premium (RERP),
   , if   and
   , if     (5) 
Because consumption is not reported in our data, one cannot construct a measure of 
uncertainty that correspond exactly to the RERP. Instead, the analysis follows most of the 
literature, e.g. Carroll (1994), Carroll & Samwick (1998), Creedy et al. (2011) and Hoynes 
& Luttner (2011) in substituting corresponding income variables for average and actual 
consumption.  In effect one assumes that individuals fully consume their disposable income, 
ruling out buffer-stock savings.
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3	 Data
The data provided by Statistics Finland are built on a ten percent population sample drawn 
from the resident population in 1995–2008.6 In the next stage Statistics Finland has collected 
for the sampled individuals data on employment, income, and some demographics. All 
the data are collected from linked administrative registers covering the whole population 
in 1995–2008. Households are formed around each sampled individual with the help of 
combining individual register data with register data covering housing units and their 
occupants in Finland. 
Our income variables are obtained from the register data underlying the Finnish total 
statistics on income distribution (Statistics Finland 2006). They include the annual income 
of both the households and the sampled individuals. The variables include the amount of 
annual income and its composition from different income sources, e.g. labour and property 
income and also taking account of taxation and public income transfers.7 Using the sample 
we can form complete and incomplete panel data sets of non-institutional population for the 
time period 1995–2008 allowing dynamic income distribution analyses for population sub-
groups with a reasonably large number of observations. 
The variables in our data include household income with components describing gross 
income, labour income, including wage income (employed) and entrepreneurial income 
(self-employed), property income of households, and public cash transfers received and 
paid by households.8 Factor income is composed of labour income, the sum of wage and 
entrepreneurial income, and property income. Disposable income, which is the key concept 
in our analysis, is formed from the income components by summing factor income with cash 
transfers received and subtracting transfers paid by households. Economic conditions and 
inequality are examined using real disposable household income which has been equivalised 
accounting for differences in household size and composition.9 In calculating inequality 
each household member is assumed to have access to an income level which is obtained by 
dividing total household income by an equivalence scale denoting the number of equivalent 
adults in the household. The (modified) OECD-equivalence scale gives weight one to the 
6 Our total “target population” consists of 5 978 470 individuals which corresponds to all who have been resident 
sometimes in Finland in 1995–2008. Note that the sample excludes individuals living in institutions.
7 In the absence of interview data, the concepts of our income data do not meet fully the national and international 
recommendations for income (Canberra Group 2001). For example we do not have access to some sources of property 
income that are either tax-exempt (imputed net rent from owner-occupied housing) or are currently taxed at the source, 
e.g. interests from bank deposits. The same applies to private transfers among households. Taxes paid and cash transfers 
from public sector are covered completely, transfers even in the case when they are tax-exempt.
8 The income sources that define disposable income are: property income, labour (earned) income which includes 
both wage income (employed) and entrepreneurial (self-employed) income, cash transfers received and income transfers 
paid. Property income includes rents, dividends, taxable interest payments, private pensions and realised capital gains. 
Entrepreneurial income accrues to self-employed from agriculture, forestry and firms. Wage income consists of money 
wages, salaries, value of managerial stock options and compensations in kind, deducting work expenses related to these 
earnings. Cash transfers received include, housing benefits and child benefits, unemployment and welfare assistance, 
unemployment and sick insurance and national and occupational old age, disability and unemployment pensions. 
Income transfers paid include direct taxes and social security contributions paid by the household members. The sum of 
property and labour income corresponds to factor income. Adding cash transfers gives gross income. Disposable income 
is obtained by deducting income transfers paid.
9 Cost-of-living-index data (Statistics Finland) have been used to transform nominal annual values to real values, in 
2008 prices.
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first member in the household, weight 0.5 to each additional member in the household over 
13 and 0.3 to those under 13 years of age. 
The target population is individuals living in private households. Those living in 
institutions and individuals with top-coded income data (the one percent of those having the 
highest incomes) are excluded.10 Top-coded income data and deletion of these observations 
mean that we cannot consider mobility in, out, or within the top income group. In light of 
Finnish experience with a considerable increase in the top income shares, which do not 
show up in our data, and their influence on the increasing values of inequality indices, one 
would expect that observed increase in annual income inequality will be in our current data 
more moderate than in official statistics. Our total sample size, including the top-coded 
observations, is 503 982 and 521 819 in 1995 and 2008, respectively. For five year complete 
panels, covering years 1995–1999, 2000–2004, and 2004–2008 we have available 463 488, 
440 275, and 474 304, respectively.
The income data are collected from administrative registers covering the whole 
population and are more accurate than, say data based on interviews, imputations and 
estimations as is commonly done in countries without access to register data, e.g. Chen 
(2009), Gangl (2005) and Jenkins (2011). Register based panel data have an additional 
advantage, as sample attrition is relatively low in comparison to survey data (see, Chen 2009 
and Ch. 4 in Jenkins 2011). In our case the 1995 cross-section has 499 072 observations and 
the 1995–1999 panel has 463 488 observations, a loss rate of 7.1 percent over a five year 
time period, counting also those lost by top-coding.
Figure 1 shows the annual Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income in three 
five-year income panels, 1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004–2008. For comparison we have 
included the corresponding cross-sectional Gini coefficients in 1995–2008 from Income 
distribution statistics (Statistics Finland) which are based on sample surveys whose final 
sample size is around 10 000 households, and register-based total statistics on income 
distribution which includes original observations for top-coded data (total statistics in Figure 
1). Our income panel data have been top-coded and the data in Income distribution statistics 
include some (tax-exempt) income data which are not available from administrative registers 
but are collected with interviews, such as housing and housing expenses data used to impute 
net rent from owner-occupied housing, and interest income from bank deposits and inter-
household private transfers. As expected the Gini-coefficients from the income panel data of 
the current study are uniformly at a lower level than annual values from Income distribution 
statistics and those from total statistics. However, they show quite similar evolution in time. 
Figure 2 reveals that a corresponding comparison using equivalised factor income 
gives a different picture. Here the annual values within a given income panel show an 
extra, increasing time trend compared to the cross-sectional values, and shows a tendency 
for relative inequality to increase as the individuals in a panel age. For example the panel 
starting in 2004 has a clearly lower value of Gini in 2004 than the panel starting in 2000. 
Additional reasons for the trend, other than sample attrition, are the facts that as individuals 
10 The underlying population data are confidential. To guarantee the confidentiality of the individuals included in our 
sample Statistics Finland has top-coded all observations in the top one percent of the income distribution in each sample 
year. These observations are left out of the analysis. Their omission may bias our measures of income inequality and 
income mobility downwards.  
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within a given income panel age, eventually there will be no individuals left at the early 
ages, and simultaneously the share of retired persons increases. One may conclude that 
those households with small children (0–4 years) have somewhat different distribution of 
factor income than the rest of the population, but their distribution of disposable income 
corresponds more closely to that of the rest of population, and in particular to those near 
retirement age.
   
Figure 1.
The Gini coefficients of equivalised household disposable income in income panels 1995–1999, 
2000–2004, 2004–2008 and annual values from the Income distribution statistics and Total 
statistics on income distribution (Statistics Finland).
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Figure 2.
The Gini coefficients of equivalised household factor income in income panels 1995–1999, 
2000–2004, 2004–2008 and annual values from the Income distribution statistics and Total 
statistics on income distribution (Statistics Finland).
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4	 Results
Varying the time horizon for the 1995–2002 income panel data in calculating the income 
rigidity index gives stability profiles, R
T
 which show how the amount of observed stability 
depends on both the income structure and the length of time horizon, T = 2,...,8. Using the 
Gini coefficient 92.9 percent of income inequality (decreases by 7.1 percent) as measured 
by average income persists relative to annual income inequality when cumulated over three 
years and 86.9 percent persists (decreases by 13.1 percent) when cumulated over 8 years, 
in the 1995–2002 income panel data (Figure 3). These values indicate substantial income 
mobility in Finland. In the following five year long income panel data in 1995–1999, 2000–
2004 and 2004–2008 are examined to uncover temporal change in mobility and inequality in 
longer term (five year) average incomes. 
Figure 3.
Income stability profiles for real equivalent disposable household income (Gini coefficient) by 
time horizon, in (8 year) income panels 1995–2002, 2001–2008.
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Using the Gini coefficient, income inequality of disposable equivalised household income 
decreases by 10.1 percent when cumulated over five years in the 1995–1999 income panel 
data. Subsequently, the corresponding mobility values show some decrease, 8.8 and 8.6 
percent in the 2000–2004 and 2004–2008 income panels, respectively (for 1995–1999 and 
2000–2004, see also Suoniemi & Rantala 2010 where the corresponding value was 0.110, 
for the 1995–1999 income panel).11 These values are in line with those reported in a recent 
study by Chen (2009) for the United States, Great Britain and Germany in the 1990’s (see 
Table A2, p. 98).  For example, the mobility value for the five years time period using Gini 
11 They also present comparisons of the Finnish mobility profiles of the Gini coefficient with other inequality indices, the 
Theil entropy measure and (half) the coefficient of variation squared. Apart from the scale difference there was hardly any 
difference in the shape of the profiles.
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is 0.107 in the United States, 0.110 in Great Britain, and 0.098 in Germany.12 However, there 
are caveats about comparability of income data across studies.13 The mobility values in the 
current data are probably lowered due to deleting the top-coded income data and including 
retired persons depending on pensions with less volatility in their fixed income.
In Finland annual income inequality has increased simultaneously as the income 
mobility has decreased (Figures 1 & 3). The values of the Gini coefficient for the (five year) 
average in disposable income are 20.14 percent in 1995–1999, 22.80 percent in 2000–2004, 
and 23.73 percent in 2004–2008. There has been a clear permanent rise in inequality. The 
observed rise in permanent inequality is in line with the fast increase in the annual values 
of the Gini coefficient until 2000 (Figure 1). In fact, in comparing the early 2000’s to 2004–
2008 one finds a further increase in the values of the Gini for average income, whereas there 
is no further change in income mobility.
Mobility and age
In the following we will compare the results of three five-year income panels covering years 
1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004–2008, respectively. The comparison of incomes panels 
reveals interesting temporal changes in inequality and mobility in 1995–2008. Table 1 
presents the values of the Gini coefficient of the (five year) average equivalised household 
disposable income and the corresponding mobility index for population subgroups relating 
to individuals belonging to 5 year age groups from 0–4 years of age to 75–79 (and the final 
group 80–89 years old).14 
Note that though we follow individuals in our income panels the evaluation of their 
economic welfare is based on equivalised household income. Therefore evaluation is 
affected by changes in family size and its composition above the effects of unemployment, 
illness, retirement, good or bad luck, or macroeconomic events. Changes in family size and 
its composition are probably most important for both young and old, retired individuals. 
Sample attrition by institutionalisation and death will probably affect the results in the oldest 
age groups. 
12 Gangl (2005) has utilized the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data to study income mobility in 11 
European Union countries during the second half of the 1990’s over six annual survey interviews and to compare with 
the U.S. data. In four countries with low income inequality the mobility indices obtained the values, 0.150 for Denmark, 
0.100 for Germany, 0.110 for Netherlands and 0.150 for Belgium using the Gini coefficient. In four countries with high 
income inequality the corresponding figures were, 0.07 for Ireland, 0.10 for Spain, 0.13 for Greece and 0.08 for Portugal, 
with countries ordered in ascending order with respect to annual income inequality. In addition Gangl (2005) concluded 
that the European labour markets with low inequality are no less dynamic than the high-inequality United States one, 
and the cross-national differences in annual income inequality closely reflect the cross-national inequality differences in 
permanent incomes measured over a longer period of time. 
13 In the panel data used by Chen (2009) the sample attrition is higher, some income data are imputed or estimated, the 
data has been trimmed at both ends of the distribution (affecting 4.5 to 9 percent of data), and the adult equivalent scale 
used (square root of the total number of household members) is different from that in this study. In the ECHP data, used by 
Gangl (2005), the analysis is confined to population aged 25–55. The equivalence scale is comparable to that used in our 
study. However, Gangl (2005) reports that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the scale.
14 Movements in short-term income inequality and income mobility may reflect differences in macro-economic 
conditions. It is thus more appropriate to look at longer-term (5 year) mobility. Figure A1 shows values of inequality 
indices for individual years and cumulative average incomes and time profiles of the mobility indices for five year income 
panels starting in 1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004–2008 using disposable income. In Figure A1 the top panel shows 
the values of the inequality measure for individual sample years for each income panel. The middle panel shows the 
corresponding values for cumulative income (time horizons from 2 to 5 years) in each income panel. Analogously, the 
bottom panel gives the values of the stability index.
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It is frequently observed that income mobility is decreasing with age with most of the 
change taking place in early working years. Shorrocks (1980) examined mobility in labour 
incomes using Michigan panel data on income dynamics. For males reporting each year 
positive labour incomes, income stability increased with age. The Gini mobility values were 
highest for the young, under the age 30, but were broadly similar for all other age groups.15
In the 1995–1999 income panel data, the mobility in disposable income is highest for 
young adults, in the three age groups consisting of the 15–29 years old (Table 1). After 
that age, the mobility values tend to stabilise and decrease slowly until one gets near the 
retirement age when we see a further drop in income mobility (Table 1). In the 1995–1999 
panel data mobility is lowest in the oldest age groups, those with individuals at least 65 
years old in 1995, and due to ageing, at least 70 years old in 1999, whose incomes are based 
on pensions, a relatively fixed income source.16 
Income mobility has decreased in the 2000–2004 panel data in all age groups. The 
change from the 1995–1999 panel data is largest in the groups consisting of young adults. 
This holds true also for the three age groups which are past the normal retirement age, but 
for them the corresponding change is smaller, and is reversed for the oldest age group. 
Because the decrease in mobility has affected more the working age groups, the values of 
the mobility index are in the age groups, 50–54 and 55–59 years old currently quite near the 
value in the age group 65–69 (Table 1). 
Shorrocks’s income mobility index (1) is measured in relative terms, in proportion 
to the weighted mean of the annual values of the Gini coefficient over the time period. 
Alternatively, extent of mobility can be shown (one-to-one) as the relative increase in the 
value of Gini of average income, needed to obtain the value of the weighted mean Gini in 
the time period,    Figures 4–6 show these measurements in absolute terms. To 
be more specific, the absolute mobility part (dark shade) shown on top of the value of Gini 
of average income (light shade) is equal to the nominator, i.e. the difference,
 
        (6)
of the weighted sum of annual values of the Gini coefficient and the Gini coefficient of 
average income (Figures 4–6). Although, we found a clear decrease in the values of 
(relative) mobility index (Table 1), in absolute terms (Figures 4 and 5), there is little, or no 
change. Therefore, the decrease in the relative measure seems to be related to the rise in the 
denominator of (1), showing the change in annual income inequality (Table 1 and Figure 7) 
while the rise in annual Gini is closely tracking the corresponding rise in Gini coefficient of 
average income in (6). Similarly, the absolute mobility parts stay remarkably constant in the 
15 On the whole the results for females with positive labour incomes were similar to those for men but the increase 
in income stability with age more or less vanished in the female sample. This suggests that transitory fluctuations were 
significant for female low earners well into middle age. Shorrocks suggests that this may be due to more frequent part-
time or seasonal work among women. Interestingly enough, family income exhibited no more stability than male earnings, 
showing limited opportunities to income insurance by family labour supply.     
16 Income mobility studies are rare for those over retirement age. Jenkins (2011) reports that men and women aged 60 
years or more have substantially lower transitory variances of income than other groups. However, Bardasi et al. (2002) 
find increased risk of low income incidence and mobility into low income for retired people in the UK. This encourages a 
further study of mobility into low income, a line of research with important policy implications. 
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age bracket, 35–64 years. For older people, not only the (relative) income mobility indices 
have lower values but also the absolute mobility parts are clearly smaller than for those in 
their prime working years. 
 
Figure 4.
Gini coefficient in (five year) average equivalised household disposable income, absolute income 
mobility and age in 1995 –1999.
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Figure 5.
Gini coefficient in (five year) average equivalised household disposable income, absolute income 
mobility and age in 2000 –2004.
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Figure 6.
Gini coefficient in (five year) average equivalised household disposable income, absolute income 
mobility and age in 2004 –2008.
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Figure 7.
Gini coefficient in (five year) average equivalised household disposable income and age in 1995–
1999, 2000–2004 and 2004 –2008.
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The change in income mobility between the income panels 2000–2004 and 2004–2008 has 
been more modest, and in some age groups there has been a reversal in the direction of 
change. Notable is the continued decrease in mobility affecting the age groups consisting of 
children under the age of 15 (Table 1). But again there is hardly any change in the absolute 
mobility terms (Figures 5 and 6).
Income inequality of average disposable income is clearly increasing in adult age until 
the age group, 55–59, but in the first 1995–1999 income panel data the peak in inequality 
occurred earlier, in the age group, 50–54 years (Figure 7). After that income inequality 
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steadily decreases with the exception of the oldest age group, 80–89 years. This is probably 
due to the attrition of the household population by death and institutionalisation. Children 
and young people, 0–19 years old, have relatively high values of the Gini coefficient. 
This may lie underneath the recent aggravation of social problems affecting particularly 
households with many dependent children and rise in child poverty (Salmi et al. 2009 and 
Riihelä et al. 2007).
There was a general and significant rise in permanent income inequality in the late 
1990’s (Figure 7). The income inequality of the whole population must take into account not 
only inequality within the age groups but also inequality between the age groups. For the 
whole Finnish population the Gini coefficient of disposable equivalised household income 
in the 1995–1999 panel data was 20.14 percent whereas the corresponding value in the 
2000–2004 data was 22.80 percent, a 13 percent increase. The simultaneous rise in annual 
cross-sectional values of the Gini coefficient has not been due to transitory factors. 
The age profile reveals continued but more moderate trend in the income inequality 
after the early 2000’s within most age groups. The value of the Gini coefficient of average 
disposable household income in the 2004–2008 panel data was 23.73 percent, a further rise 
by 4 percent.
Figure 8.
Gini coefficient in (five year) average equivalised household factor income and age in 1995–
1999, 2000–2004 and 2004 –2008.
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Comparing the results for disposable income with those for factor income gives useful 
insight to the mechanism of income redistribution by public sector and temporal changes 
in its operation. Inequality of average factor income is naturally much higher than that of 
disposable income. The exceptionally high values for pensioners clearly show that for those 
past their working-years have their remaining factor incomes distributed very unequally 
(Figure 8). For older people, and those near the retirement age, over 55 years old, there 
has been a clear temporal drop in factor income inequality. This finding may reflect both 
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demographic change and rapid economic growth after the exceptionally deep economic 
crisis in the early 1990’s which affected particularly elderly workers. 
Interestingly enough, there seems to be less mobility in factor income than in disposable 
income (Table 2). The observations runs counter to our intuition on the operation of 
income transfers and taxes as implicit insurance mechanism and automatic stabilisers in the 
economy. However, they are similar to the findings concerning market income in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden by Aaberge et al. (2002).17 Our data refer to the total population in 
Finnish households and include a substantial portion of economically inactive households 
dependent on income transfers and by definition with a stable (zero) factor income. The 
results in economically active subgroups of the population are somewhat different, cf. the 
results on income risk, below. If average factor income is considered the age profile of 
income mobility is generally similar to that of disposable income (Table 2). Factor income 
mobility is naturally highest for the young, 15–29 years old, and lowest for the oldest 
age groups. But even old age people are exposed to factor income mobility, Finally, one 
observes a decreasing trend in the mobility of factor income over the sample period 1995–
2008 (Table 2).
In contrast to disposable income, permanent factor income inequality in late 1990’s (the 
values of the Gini coefficient) does not show a general widening (Table 2 and Figure 8). One 
can observe a mild increase in inequality in children, 0–19 years old, but the rise is not very 
pronounced and minor comparing to that observed in disposable incomes. For the whole 
Finnish population the Gini coefficient of equivalised household factor income was 43.23, 
43.40 and 43.57 percent, in the 1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004–2008 income panel data, 
respectively.  
Risk-adjusted average income and age
So far, income mobility has been examined from a positive point of view by considering 
the potentially beneficial effects of mobility on equalization of longer term income 
inequality, together with remaining inequality of longer term average incomes. In doing 
this the undesirable effects of income fluctuations over time have been neglected. The 
shift of assessment to multi-period inequality would mean that future uncertainty about 
incomes must be accounted for in the evaluation procedure. Faced with less than perfect 
capital markets, risk-averse economic agents view rise in income fluctuations as an increase 
in income risk which lowers economic well-being in comparison with a steady flow of 
income. The uncertainty aspect of income mobility is a key dimension of income mobility. 
A completely mobile society would mean complete economic insecurity.
Therefore, emphasis is now shifted to examining longer term average incomes which 
will be controlled for the risk premium due to income fluctuations. In the evaluation average 
17 Note that Aaberge et al. (2002) defined market (factor) income to include work-related transfers, such as 
unemployment insurance, sick pay and part-time pensions. In addition they assigned income per adult member rather 
than conventional equivalised income. Aaberge et al. (2002) found substantial income mobility in Scandinavian countries 
which was comparable to or even above the levels in the United States, a country with relatively high annual values of 
income inequality. 
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income is compared with the corresponding risk-adjusted, certainty equivalent income 
concept. Neoclassical economic theory assumes that household utility is based on flow of 
consumption not income. Therefore the proper risk premium should be calculated in terms 
of consumption. Since there is available no data on consumption, the analysis follows most 
of the literature in substituting corresponding income variables for average and actual 
consumption.18 In effect, one is confined to analysing that part of insurance of household 
income which is affected, first, by adjusting individual supply of working hours and family 
labour supply (self-insurance), and second, by redistribution programs operated by public 
sector, progressive taxation, social insurance and transfers.
Preference toward risk is assumed to be of the constant relative risk aversion form. The 
calculations are made separately for several values of  the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion. The relative equivalent risk premium (5), the income risk arising from 
the annual variation of income around the (five year) average income is estimated as the 
mean of individual risk premiums over a stratum of the sample population. The classification 
of households is based on factors likely to affect labour market risk, the education level (6 
levels), and socio-economic status (18 classes) of the sampled individual, in total 6*18 = 
108 classes. To be more exact, for an individual in an age group j, with education status k 
and socio-economical status l,
, if  and
, if 
where   and  are simple indicator functions. 
Estimations are done separately for each income panel data sets, 1995–1999, 2000–2004 
and 2004–2008, and each age groups, 0–4  75–79, 80–89 years old. In the following step, 
the average household income of each individual is adjusted with the value of corresponding 
risk premium applicable to the population sub-group (panel, age group, education level 
and socio-economic status) which the individual belongs to.19 To give an example, a 
lengthy Appendix presents estimates of the relative equivalent risk premiums in household 
disposable income in the 2000–2004 income panel data with  with their estimated 
standard errors.
A conservative choice of , the coefficient of relative risk aversion, , would 
correspond to the logarithmic utility function. In the following we discuss mainly the results 
18 To be exact, this measure would be identical to the true consumption-based measures only if the households 
consumed exactly its income. Because rational households hold assets to insure consumption against shocks to income, 
the stochastic element in consumption will be less variable than the corresponding income term. 
19 Each age-group is treated differently in an effort to separate income fluctuations corresponding to income risk from 
the life-cycle pattern in income. This also motivates using a relatively short time-spans, 5 years. 
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with  the same (plausible) baseline value as in Hoynes & Luttner (2011).20 In the 
1995–1999 income panel data, this choice corresponds to a population mean of 5.7 percent 
relative risk premium, equivalent to 980 euros (in 2008 prices) in equivalised household 
disposable income. This corresponds to the monetary value which households would be 
willing to forgo from a certain income level, and still be as well off as with the random 
income flow, they face. In these terms and with our assumptions the mean income risk is in 
Finland a reasonable one, if one considers the precautionary saving motives.21
Comparing the average equivalised disposable household income and the corresponding 
risk-adjusted, certainty equivalent income between the (five year) age groups reveals that 
the certainty equivalent disposable incomes stay relative flat from the mid-twenties until the 
age group 40–44 years of age. After that the age profile rises steeply until there is a gradual 
decline in mid-fifties as people start to retire (Figures 9 and 10). On the average, those 
over retirement age have the lowest levels of risk-adjusted, certainty equivalent disposable 
income. Gradual voluntary postponement of retirement age is likely to lay behind the 
temporal narrowing of the income gap between those in the age group, 50–54, and those in 
the group, 55–59 years old.
After 30 years of age the relative risk premiums stay quite stable, 4.2–4.8 percent of 
disposable income. In the oldest, post-retirement age groups the risk premiums are lower, 
2.2–2.5 percent of disposable income. Jenkins (2011) reports that men and women aged 60 
years or more have substantially lower variances of transitory income than other groups. 
Here the low values may in small part be due to the method of calculating the premium.22
20 For results based on alternative values,  1, . . . ,5, the reader should consult Tables 3–6.
21 In calculating the risk-premium the income variables have to take positive values. Therefore they have been bottom-
coded with 120 euros in annual real equivalised income (1995 prices). This has little influence on the measurements 
which use disposable income. However factor income is frequently observed with zero values, for example in the case of 
pensioners, which may have some influence on the specific values one observes. 
22 In the data, all pensioners share in the same socio-economic status and only education level is available to separate 
income risks among these age groups, whereas among the working-age population the socio-economic status offers a 
much wider scale of possible variation in income risk. Similarly all dependent children have in the data their individual 
education levels with less scope to separate income risks. However, their socio-economic status is that of the household 
head’s (Appendix). 
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Figure 9.
Average (five year) equivalised household disposable income, risk-adjusted  = 3, disposable 
income and age in 1995 –1999.
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Figure 10.
Average (five year) equivalised household disposable income, risk-adjusted  = 3, disposable 
income and age in 2000 –2004.
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Figure 11.
The Gini coefficients of average equivalised household disposable income and risk-adjusted 
income  = 3, and age in 1995 –1999.
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Figure 12.
The Gini coefficients of average equivalised household disposable income and risk-adjusted 
income  = 3, and age in 2000 –2004.
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Cursory glance reveals no change in the relative risk premium between the income panel 
data in 1995–1999 and 2000–2004. This holds also true for the age profile of the Gini-
coefficients which have been calculated for average disposable income and the corresponding 
risk-adjusted, certainty equivalent income (Figures 11 and 12). Those over retirement age 
have relatively low levels of the Gini-coefficients with the exception of the very old, over 80 
years of age (at the start of the panel). The exception is probably due to the attrition of the 
household population by death and institutionalisation. 
It is natural to expect that the values of the Gini coefficient are somewhat higher in 
the case of risk-adjusted income variables, since they incorporate some of the original 
variation in income. But mathematically this does need not hold, since the reference point, 
mean income is also changed, as one may observe in the age groups referring to children 
in the income panel data 1995–1999 (Figure 12). The values of the Gini coefficient of risk-
adjusted, certainty equivalent disposable household income do not change noticeably in the 
working-age population (with some exceptions, they are only 0.2–0.3 percentage points 
higher) from those of average equivalised disposable household income. Remarkably, for 
old age people, over 65 years of age, risk-adjusted disposable incomes have almost the same 
values of the Gini coefficient as the unadjusted average incomes. Although they are exposed 
to some income risk (Figures 9–10). 
Comparison of age profiles across the income panel data in 1995–1999 and 2000–
2004 and 2004–2008 reveals a steady and uniformly increasing time trend in risk-adjusted, 
certainty equivalent average disposable income (Figure 13). Same holds for the Gini 
coefficient of the certainty equivalent average disposable income. But here the change from 
panel 1995–1999 to panel 2000–2004 is much larger than the subsequent change from panel 
2000–2004 to panel 2004–2008 (Figure 14). The relevant figures for unadjusted (five year) 
average household disposable income and the corresponding Gini coefficients are reported 
in Tables 3 (row  0) and 1, respectively.23 
  
23 Table 3 present unadjusted (  0) and risk-adjusted, certainty equivalent average disposable incomes in five year 
age groups. Average risk premiums can be calculated as relative differences between certainty equivalent and unadjusted 
incomes. For example, taking  3 in the panel 2000–2004, and age group, 65–69 years old, the risk premium is 
(17 130–16 696)/17 130 which is equal to 2.5 per cent of average equivalised disposable household income.
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Figure 13.
Average (five year) risk-adjusted  = 3, equivalised household disposable income and age in 
1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004 –2008.
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Figure 14.
The Gini coefficient of average, risk-adjusted  = 3, equivalised household disposable income 
and age in 1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004 –2008.
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As expected, there is considerably more variation in household factor income. In the 1995–
1999 income panel data, this corresponds to an average relative risk premium of 21.5 
percent, equivalent to 3 742 euros in equivalised household factor income, with  3. In 
the working-age population sub-groups, the average values range from 6 366 euros (25–
29) to 2 843 euros (40–44 years old). There is substantial labour market risk in Finland, 
even after allowing for self-insurance by adjusting individual supply of working hours and 
family labour supply. Shorrocks (1980) reported that comparison of family income with 
male earnings showed limited opportunities to income insurance by family labour supply. 
Income risk of this magnitude is beyond the low-income households’ means. Comparison 
with the corresponding mean risk premium in disposable income 981 euros clearly shows 
the potential for implicit income insurance by the redistribution programs consisting of 
progressive taxation, social insurance and transfers.
Figure 15.
The Gini coefficient of average, risk-adjusted  = 3, equivalised household factor income and age 
in 1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004 –2008.
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The age profiles of average risk-adjusted  3 household factor income show a steady 
income growth in the observation period 1995–2008 (Table 4). The increase in factor 
incomes has been particularly strong in the age group 55–59 years old, reflecting voluntary 
postponement of retirement age and continued participation in the labour force. In 
comparison to the case of disposable income, there are pronounced differences between 
the risk-adjusted, certainty equivalent and unadjusted means of household factor income 
(  0), indicating considerable factor income risk, especially among young adults but even 
in the case of old age people (Table 4). 
There has been some within age-group decrease in factor income inequality during the 
observation period. The values of the Gini coefficient are generally highest in the income 
panel data in 1995–1999 (Figure 15). Household with children, age 0–19 years, make an 
exception. This may reflect worsening labour market position of households with many 
dependent children, (Salmi et al. 2009). Simultaneously the poverty rate among children 
Income mobility, income risk and age – Finnish experiences in 1995–2008 31
has grown much faster than the poverty rate in the whole population (Riihelä et al. 2007). 
In Figure 15 the values get very high in old age, since the absence of factor incomes for 
most pensioner households. The Gini-coefficients get so large that the specific values are no 
longer informative. But their observed temporal change is in line with the change shown in 
Figure 8 for unadjusted factor income. 
For the whole Finnish population the values of the Gini coefficient of risk-adjusted, 
certainty equivalent household factor income ( ) are about 4 percentage points higher 
than those of average household factor income. The Gini coefficients of risk-adjusted 
household equivalised factor income are 47.77, 47.51 and 47.82 percent, in the 1995–1999, 
2000–2004 and 2004–2008 income panel data, respectively, and stay remarkably constant 
in the sample period.
Redistribution and income insurance
An established measure indicating how much redistribution does government achieve by 
public programs, cash transfers paid to households and household direct taxes (income taxes 
and employee social security contributions), can be calculated as the difference in income 
inequality before and after taxes and transfers (the Gini coefficients of equivalised factor 
income and disposable income). Figure 16 shows the corresponding difference for average, 
risk-adjusted , certainty equivalent equivalised household income by age. Figure 17 
reports redistribution of unadjusted (five year) average equivalised income.
Observed “redistribution within age groups” is considerably larger in risk-adjusted 
income measures.24 The public sector operates a considerable income insurance mechanism, 
over and above the redistribution of average (five year) income. Surprisingly, the age profiles 
of income redistribution are quite flat over a large part of the “life-cycle”. The families with 
children do not seem to stand out in the comparison. Income redistribution effect jumps up 
at the post-retirement age groups. The jump is no surprise since most pensioners receive 
almost all of their income from public transfers, and their factor incomes are distribute 
quite unequally. The differences between the Gini-coefficients get so large that the specific 
numbers are no longer informative but their observed temporal change is in line with the rest 
of the population.25 Note that the remarkable temporal change affecting the age groups, 55–
59 and 60–64 years old, is again due to the voluntary postponement of retirement age during 
the observation period. More importantly, the data in average incomes point out that there 
has been a substantial cut-back in public redistribution from the late 1990’s. 
The changes observable in Figures 16 & 17 hold for redistribution effects within tightly 
defined age groups (birth year cohorts), and do not tell the whole story about redistribution 
over the whole life-cycle. However, comparison of the adjacent age groups across panels 
reveals changes in about a 10 year time span, since, for example those of 25–29 years old 
in the 1995–1999 income panel data will be 34–38 years old in the 2004–2009 panel data.
24 The Gini coefficients are calculated separately for each five year age groups. Therefore they do not show that part in 
distribution of income and public redistribution between age groups which are affected by group size and group means, 
and provide a simple but crude method to control for trends that affect these components. On the other hand, this ignores 
the question, how redistribution is financed (in part by other age groups, see Figures 17 and 18). 
25 For simplicity, consider in Figures 16 and 17 that they are financed through the mean contributions by the other age 
groups, see Figures 18 and 19. 
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Figure 16.
Public sector redistribution of average, risk-adjusted  = 3, equivalised household income within 
age-groups, in 1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004 –2008.
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Figure 17.
Public sector redistribution of average, equivalised household income within age-groups, in 
1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004 –2008.
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For the whole Finnish household population redistribution effects, as measured by the 
difference of Gini coefficients, of risk-adjusted equivalised household income were 25.06, 
22.44 and 21.87 percent, in the 1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004–2008 income panel data, 
respectively (Table 6). In unadjusted equivalised household income the corresponding 
figures were 23.09, 20.60 and 19.84. Differences of these numbers, taken here as indicating 
redistribution of income risk, implicit income insurance by public sector, corresponds to 
about two percentage points and 9 per cent of total amount of redistribution of equivalised 
household income using relative risk aversion coefficient, . In the sample period 
redistribution of both (five year) average unadjusted and risk-adjusted household income 
has decreased by 3.3–3.6 percentage points (13–14 percent) if the 1995–1999 and 2004–
2008 income panel data are compared (Table 6).  
 Figure 18 shows, how the mean burden of the public net transfers underlying the 
redistribution programs is shared by age, see also Table 5. On the average, all age groups 
seem to be net payers until the mid-fifties, and the burden in €’s paid is increasing from 
the early 2000’s on. Pensioners are the biggest gainers in the mean values. Their cash 
transfers net of taxes have increased during the observation period (Figure 18), although 
we found a decreased redistribution effect within the group (Figure 17). On the other hand, 
the net payments made by the working-age groups have increased on the average. Since the 
different age groups are not of same size the age profiles of mean net transfers do not reveal 
the total scale of redistribution in the society, and for example the relative size of the baby-
boom generation is not displayed here. Furthermore, cash transfers are also financed with 
other than household taxes, such as indirect taxes and corporate taxes, and there is a sizeable 
element of non-cash transfers in publicly-provided services, to be accounted for before the 
whole picture of redistribution is complete.
Figure 19 gives the corresponding risk-adjusted, , figures for public net transfers. 
Comparison with Figure 18 reveals, reveals how both young adults, 15–29 years old and 
elderly near retirement age 55–59 years old, seem to benefit most from implicit income 
insurance by public sector. However, all age groups, including old age people gain from 
redistribution in certainty equivalent income relative to unadjusted cash redistribution.
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Figure 18.
Mean net transfers in average, equivalised household income and age in 1995–1999, 2000–
2004 and 2004 –2008.
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Figure 19.
Mean net transfers in average, risk-adjusted  = 3 equivalised household income and age in 
1995–1999, 2000–2004 and 2004 –2008.
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Above we have shown results for a baseline choice of the relative risk aversion coefficient, 
, as in Hoynes & Luttner (2011). Tables 3 & 4 give the results from calculations which 
vary the values of , the coefficient of relative risk aversion. If a larger value is chosen, by 
definition the larger risk premium one gets. In the 2004–2008 income panel data, with  
the average relative risk premium is 10.3 percent (2 337 €) in equivalised household factor 
income, with  5 the risk premium rises to 23.1 percent (5 244 €, Table 4). In terms of 
equivalised disposable income the corresponding figures are 2.5 percent (552 €), , and 
8.6 percent (1 896 €),  5 (Table 3). 
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Similarly the extent of implicit public income insurance is increased with the value of . 
For example, in the 2004–2008 income panel data implicit income insurance (the difference 
between the redistribution of risk-adjusted and unadjusted income,  0) is 2.03 percentage 
points with  1, and it rises to 4.05 with  5 (Table 6). If the change in the income 
redistribution from the 1995–1999 income panel data to the 2004–2008 income panel data 
is considered there is no such clear cut dependence, with  0 no risk, the change is 3.25 
percentage points (decrease), with  1, the change is slightly smaller 3.19 percentage 
points, after that the values increase, getting to 3.62, with  5. 
However, income redistribution has been reduced in the sample period, and the result is 
not dependent on whether one considers risk-adjusted income measures or cash measure. 
Above a decrease in income mobility in the sample period has been found in equivalised 
disposable income but not in factor income, and therefore attributed to the effects of 
redistribution. Although this may have reduced the risk component in individual incomes 
the effect has not off-set the decrease in redistribution in cash. 
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5	 Conclusion	and	discussion	
It has long been recognized that income distributions with income cumulated over a longer 
time horizon give a better picture of inequality and economic welfare than distributions 
based on snapshot income. Annual income distributions may give even distorted picture of 
longer-term economic well-being. The paper has examined Finnish income mobility and 
permanent income inequality and their temporal evolution using a large income panel data 
in 1995–2008. The results indicate substantial income mobility in Finland and equalization 
in longer term average incomes. The data show a clear decrease in mobility of equivalised 
disposable household income over the sample period. However, the decrease in the (relative) 
mobility measure seems to be related to the rise in the permanent income inequality, and the 
mobility values, in absolute terms, stay remarkably constant, in the age bracket 35–64 years 
old. The rise in annual Gini is closely tracking the corresponding rise in Gini coefficient of 
permanent (average) income. In addition, there seems to be less mobility in factor income 
than in disposable income, and in contrast to disposable income the values of the Gini 
coefficient do not show a general widening in permanent factor income inequality in late 
1990’s and 2000’s. There has been a substantial cut-back in public redistribution. Old age 
people experience less income mobility than other age groups, but contrary to conventional 
wisdom they are not in a static phase of life. They have some mobility even in their factor 
incomes. 
Subsequently, this paper examined to what extent one can equate income mobility with 
income risk. Income mobility is frequently seen to represent a positive element in society 
whereas income risk imposes costs to risk-averse households without access to perfect 
capital markets. How to introduce income mobility as an equalizer of longer term income 
into the social objective function, while simultaneously recognising the role of risk, is a 
demanding task (Fields 2010). Creedy et al. (2011) present a framework which comes 
nearest to the one used in the current paper. Here relative risk premiums are estimated to 
adjust individual average incomes for risk aversion. The results look reasonable. In our 
data the population mean of relative risk premiums in disposable income is 5.7 percent of 
average income (980 € in 2008 euros) in the 1995–1999 income panel data and 6.2 percent 
(1 370 €) in the 2004–2008 income panel data. The results depend by definition on the value 
of the degree of risk-aversion one chooses. Old age people have more stable incomes but 
are exposed to some income risk. For example, in the group, 65–69 years old, the mean 
relative risk premium in disposable income is 2.46 percent of their average income (370 € 
in 2008 euros) in the 1995–1999 income panel data and 2.53 percent (430 €) in the 2004–
2008 income panel data. 
To obtain reasonable estimates of risk premiums, education level, socio-economic status 
and age, factors likely to affect variability of income, are controlled for. A large number 
of observations available in the data facilitates this rather detailed procedure based on 
weak distributional assumptions. Naturally the results depend on the conditioning factors. 
Including more conditioning factors one tends to get more variation in the estimators of 
income risk. In the extreme case one would equate all income variation at the individual 
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level with income risk. To give an example, assume constant relative risk aversion together 
with social preferences with constant relative inequality aversion, as in Creedy & Wilhelm 
(2002). Assume for simplicity that these parameters would have same value, so one would 
weight risk within individuals and inequality between individuals equally.26 In this special 
case of Creedy & Wilhelm (2002), one could combine aversions to inequality and income 
variability to a single index calculated as the Atkinson inequality index over all observation 
in the income panel. All income variation at the individual level is not to be equated with 
unpredictable income risk.27 The method used is a simple and straight-forward one, and 
next step in the analysis would be to consider robustness of results to the chosen set of 
conditioning factors used to estimate income risk.   
In the current paper an effort has been made in separating income risk from the life-
cycle effects on the income process by conditioning the estimators of relative risk premium 
on age. This is an important aspect and life-cycle effects should be given a more thoughtful 
treatment in studies of income risk. In the future greater reliance on potentially volatile 
income sources in old age and increasing longevity makes it more likely that older people 
may observe substantial changes in their income. Old age is not a static phase of life and 
post-retirement income dynamics is of growing policy importance. 
Finally, this paper presents estimates on the redistribution effect using differences between 
Gini coefficients of equivalised factor and disposable household income. Risk-adjusted¸ 
certainty equivalent income concepts are utilised to get potentially useful information on 
redistribution of risk (an additional indicator of implicit income insurance), and may be 
considered as adding to the literature. The amount of implicit income risk one observes is 
naturally dependent on the degree of risk aversion assumed. All age groups, including old 
age people gain from redistribution in certainty equivalent income relative to unadjusted 
redistribution of cash. The corresponding Gini coefficients of certainty equivalent factor and 
disposable household income also depend on the degree of risk aversion assumed. However, 
the difference between these, an indicator of implicit income insurance, is influenced less 
by the degree of risk aversion assumed. In addition, finding of reduced redistribution in 
certainty equivalent income over the sample period is robust to a particular value assumed. 
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the observed decrease in the mobility of equivalised 
disposable household income in the sample period which could have shown as lowered 
income risk has not been large enough to off-set the effects of reduced redistribution in cash. 
Hoynes & Luttner (2011) have a similar task while they estimate the (forward-looking) 
total value of state tax-and-transfer programs in the United States. Total across person 
value of state tax-and-transfer programs in the United States is approximately 1 000 $ in 
2005 dollars at the median real income with . In the current paper, one observes an 
average risk-adjusted monetary equivalent of redistribution which is 2 760 euros larger than 
the average cash redistribution (in 2008 euros), in the 1995–1999 income panel data. In 
the 2004–2008 income panel data the corresponding amount is 3 020 euros. In Finland 
26 This should not be taken for a guideline. It is used here only to make a simple remark.
27 Creedy et al. (2011) estimate relative risk premiums using three underlying parameters and relatively strong 
distributional assumptions, together with income in the initial period. The current paper utilises substantially more 
parameters (about 1000) to control for age, education level and socio-economic status in the initial period, together with 
mean income, and relatively weak distributional assumptions.
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the in-cash tax-and-transfer programs are more extensive than the state tax-and-transfer 
programs in the United States (OECD, Social expenditure database, SOCX). Furthermore, 
the methodology differs significantly. Hoynes & Luttner (2011) use more involved and 
sophisticated methods to decompose the total value of state tax-and-transfer programs into 
predictable changes in income and unexpected changes in income. They denote the last 
effect as the insurance value of state programs. Current paper does not aim at to make this 
distinction in trying to separate insurance vs. redistributive components to this degree.
Accounting for saving and borrowing decisions is outside the scope of this paper and 
the available data. To uncover joint dynamics of income and consumption processes and to 
obtain more accurate measure of risk premium this would be desirable. However, such panel 
data sets are mostly unavailable and most of the literature has resorted to using income data 
instead (Blundell & Etheridge 2010 is a notable exception to the rule). Ideally, one should 
also take note on adjustments in replacements of durable goods and semi-durables which 
mechanism is particularly relevant for poor households often in the absence of simple credit 
market. In addition, there is special merit in giving the risk of being poor, and spells of low-
income, a special status in a thorough dynamic analysis, which motivates for a further study.
 Furthermore, the effects of public policies are taken into account by forward-looking, 
rational economic agents while economic decisions on labour supply and saving are made. 
Construction of the counterfactual case of no public policies is a difficult problem, and 
the problem is frequently ignored in analysing income distribution and income inequality. 
The current paper is no exception to the rule. However, Hoynes & Luttner (2011) utilize 
matching across states to control for differences in state tax-and-transfer policies and to 
obtain an estimate of the insurance value of state tax-and-transfer programs in the United 
States. 
Neoclassical welfare analysis which underlies most income distribution studies and public 
economics is firmly anchored to static models under certainty. The analysis is somewhat 
lacking in established views how to incorporate dynamics and evolving uncertainty into the 
models of, e.g. optimal tax theory. How to introduce the income mobility as an equalizer 
of longer term income into the social objective function (Fields 2010)? Have prospects 
of mobility some special merit over and above a mere comparison of static longer term 
(life cycle) income distributions? How to combine income mobility both as an equalizer 
of longer term income and as an income risk modifier into a well-defined social objective 
function (Creedy & Wilhelm 2002 and Fields 2010)? These questions confront dynamic 
welfare analysis and public economics, and empirical work like one in the current paper is 
in need of guidance by more theoretical work on these questions.
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Figure A1.
Disposable equivalised household income, time profiles of annual Gini-cofficients (top), 
stabilisation of the Gini in average income over 2,…,5 years (middle) and stability profiles over 
2,…,5 years (bottom panel) and age in the five-year income panel data, in 1995–1999, 2000–
2004 and 2004–2008.
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Appendix
Below the estimators of relative risk premium are reported for real equivalised disposable 
household income in the 2000–2004 income panel data with  by age and education 
level (6 levels) and socio-economic status (18 classes). Estimators are based on the means of 
the individual risk premiums in the population stratum in question. For an individual in an 
age group j, with education status k and socio-economical status l,
, if 
 
and  
, if  
  
where   and  are simple indicator functions.
The classifications in Tables A1 & A2 are coded as follows 
Socio-economic status Code Education level Code
farmer 10 primary & lower secondary 0
self-employed 21 upper & post secondary 3
upper white collar employees 1st stage tertiary 5B 5
– management 31 1st stage tertiary 5A low 6
– research and planning 32 1st stage tertiary 5A high 7
– education and teaching 33 2nd stage tertiary 8
– other 34
lower white collar employees
– supervising 41
– independent work 42
– non-independent work 43
– other 44
blue collar workers
– agricultural 51
– industrial 52
– other production 53
– service and logistics 54
students 60
pensioners 70
unemployed 81
others 99
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Table A1.
Relative risk premium in the 2000–2004 income panel data with  = 3, by age, education level (6 
levels) and socio-economic status (18 classes).
Soc. Ed. 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–89
10 0 0.0990 0.0962 0.1136 0.1553 0.1477 0.1127 0.0986 0.1132 0.1107 0.1024 0.1202 0.1240 0.1445 0.0346 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1550 0.1758 0.1113 0.0885 0.0908 0.0946 0.1134 0.1153 0.1227 0.1126 0.0401 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1748 0.0884 0.0963 0.0996 0.0968 0.1261 0.1161 0.1509 0.1738 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0873 0.0784 0.0603 0.0617 0.0579 0.0981 0.1101 0.1404 0.0907 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1526 0.1340 0.0990 0.1213 0.1234 0.1787 0.0485 0.1697 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0878 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
21 0 0.0962 0.0931 0.1090 0.1764 0.1623 0.1509 0.1082 0.1204 0.1031 0.1034 0.1038 0.1026 0.1009 0.0653 0.0960 0.0000 0.0000
21 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2356 0.1627 0.1184 0.0999 0.0937 0.0933 0.0912 0.1012 0.0950 0.1072 0.0841 0.0132 0.0000 0.0000
21 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1012 0.1475 0.1136 0.0898 0.1018 0.0924 0.1150 0.0948 0.0780 0.0189 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
21 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1074 0.1765 0.1034 0.0823 0.1009 0.1354 0.0958 0.1025 0.1015 0.1586 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
21 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0857 0.0996 0.0863 0.0880 0.0748 0.0922 0.1310 0.0954 0.0844 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
21 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1484 0.0640 0.1111 0.1641 0.0812 0.0392 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
31 0 0.0639 0.0574 0.0660 0.1562 0.1428 0.1017 0.0654 0.0890 0.0501 0.0552 0.0518 0.0515 0.0789 0.0325 0.2331 0.0000 0.0000
31 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3284 0.1760 0.0675 0.0734 0.0575 0.0541 0.0435 0.0488 0.0354 0.0538 0.0054 0.0594 0.0000 0.0000
31 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1759 0.0439 0.0491 0.0339 0.0471 0.0384 0.0330 0.0332 0.0292 0.1119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
31 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0712 0.0743 0.0368 0.0213 0.0339 0.0413 0.0315 0.0308 0.0240 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
31 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1568 0.0647 0.0437 0.0350 0.0315 0.0307 0.0328 0.0329 0.0213 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
31 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0441 0.1113 0.0377 0.0259 0.0532 0.0287 0.0184 0.0322 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 0 0.0444 0.0413 0.0495 0.1407 0.1626 0.1170 0.1408 0.1518 0.1003 0.0514 0.0579 0.0495 0.0171 0.0203 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2054 0.1002 0.0840 0.0572 0.0263 0.0450 0.0301 0.0382 0.0431 0.0199 0.0372 0.0115 0.0000 0.0000
32 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0555 0.0474 0.0375 0.0312 0.0243 0.0366 0.0375 0.0280 0.0285 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0637 0.0422 0.0304 0.0272 0.0231 0.0332 0.0342 0.0268 0.0354 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0999 0.0609 0.0472 0.0406 0.0342 0.0358 0.0336 0.0206 0.0280 0.0038 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000
32 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0431 0.0604 0.0363 0.0548 0.0378 0.0405 0.0588 0.0361 0.0450 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
33 0 0.0411 0.0327 0.0422 0.1372 0.1032 0.1101 0.0707 0.0549 0.0311 0.0346 0.0524 0.0324 0.0381 0.0164 0.0434 0.0000 0.0000
33 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1511 0.1286 0.0930 0.0567 0.0473 0.0525 0.0523 0.0508 0.0504 0.0293 0.0339 0.0039 0.0000 0.0000
33 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0628 0.0680 0.0462 0.0418 0.0345 0.0473 0.0348 0.0296 0.0333 0.0173 0.0061 0.0000 0.0000
33 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0615 0.0660 0.0417 0.0281 0.0297 0.0358 0.0314 0.0343 0.0258 0.0189 0.0771 0.0000 0.0000
33 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1021 0.0537 0.0419 0.0311 0.0295 0.0353 0.0397 0.0309 0.0315 0.0093 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000
33 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0718 0.0465 0.0409 0.0348 0.0527 0.0299 0.0322 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
34 0 0.0535 0.0450 0.0589 0.1680 0.1144 0.0944 0.0983 0.0418 0.0496 0.0447 0.0490 0.0306 0.0370 0.0104 0.0497 0.0000 0.0000
34 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2539 0.1469 0.1029 0.0501 0.0432 0.0415 0.0502 0.0397 0.0317 0.0547 0.0139 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000
34 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0567 0.0679 0.0531 0.0453 0.0329 0.0418 0.0331 0.0324 0.0198 0.0041 0.0183 0.0000 0.0000
34 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0958 0.0734 0.0480 0.0424 0.0313 0.0349 0.0343 0.0353 0.0276 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
34 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0555 0.0632 0.0502 0.0491 0.0361 0.0357 0.0405 0.0286 0.0286 0.0177 0.1046 0.0000 0.0000
34 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0283 0.0737 0.0437 0.0513 0.0462 0.0547 0.0606 0.0332 0.0029 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000
41 0 0.0376 0.0342 0.0422 0.1150 0.1038 0.0696 0.0665 0.0392 0.0299 0.0329 0.0318 0.0262 0.0439 0.0235 0.0317 0.0000 0.0000
41 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1737 0.0959 0.0670 0.0401 0.0311 0.0321 0.0361 0.0322 0.0258 0.0322 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
41 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0672 0.0438 0.0332 0.0292 0.0276 0.0276 0.0281 0.0302 0.0304 0.0157 0.0185 0.0000 0.0000
41 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0683 0.0502 0.0329 0.0299 0.0226 0.0334 0.0319 0.0270 0.0226 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
41 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1015 0.0573 0.0375 0.0304 0.0394 0.0406 0.0324 0.0210 0.0304 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
41 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 0.0237 0.0437 0.0000 0.0133 0.0032 0.0593 0.0141 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 0 0.0478 0.0426 0.0478 0.1369 0.0976 0.0680 0.0497 0.0458 0.0401 0.0366 0.0315 0.0319 0.0327 0.0600 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000
42 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1477 0.1070 0.0700 0.0467 0.0393 0.0409 0.0370 0.0392 0.0300 0.0348 0.0403 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0784 0.0523 0.0400 0.0356 0.0360 0.0389 0.0332 0.0328 0.0353 0.0037 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0789 0.0556 0.0522 0.0409 0.0366 0.0442 0.0438 0.0320 0.0458 0.0390 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0966 0.0601 0.0552 0.0375 0.0319 0.0473 0.0486 0.0241 0.0361 0.0122 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0361 0.0102 0.0598 0.0719 0.0663 0.0183 0.0244 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 0 0.0486 0.0551 0.0556 0.1607 0.0873 0.0732 0.0526 0.0330 0.0521 0.0370 0.0384 0.0319 0.0378 0.0528 0.1044 0.0000 0.0000
43 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1618 0.1220 0.0756 0.0494 0.0511 0.0405 0.0474 0.0435 0.0354 0.0471 0.0689 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1027 0.0532 0.0439 0.0384 0.0441 0.0365 0.0323 0.0337 0.0162 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1064 0.0994 0.0458 0.0190 0.0346 0.0615 0.1079 0.1627 0.0795 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1054 0.0991 0.0728 0.0509 0.0683 0.0232 0.0349 0.0555 0.0247 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0205 0.0000 0.0065 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0224 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Soc. Ed. 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–89
44 0 0.0426 0.0336 0.0500 0.1577 0.1121 0.0670 0.0396 0.0353 0.0343 0.0361 0.0334 0.0298 0.0302 0.0398 0.0097 0.0000 0.0000
44 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1491 0.0967 0.0591 0.0410 0.0325 0.0374 0.0343 0.0338 0.0304 0.0340 0.0098 0.0256 0.0000 0.0000
44 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0653 0.0466 0.0430 0.0319 0.0355 0.0400 0.0403 0.0378 0.0337 0.0043 0.1576 0.0000 0.0000
44 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0799 0.0487 0.0467 0.0361 0.0491 0.0397 0.0506 0.0358 0.0519 0.0129 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000
44 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0909 0.0674 0.0465 0.0366 0.0534 0.0652 0.0649 0.0355 0.0046 0.0043 0.0000 0.0000
44 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0809 0.0361 0.0504 0.0073 0.0135 0.1618 0.0000 0.0131 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 0 0.0423 0.0405 0.0674 0.1509 0.0893 0.0776 0.0620 0.0302 0.0620 0.0506 0.0456 0.0395 0.0702 0.0819 0.0156 0.0000 0.0000
51 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1153 0.0917 0.0669 0.0497 0.0355 0.0332 0.0334 0.0423 0.0308 0.0336 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000
51 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0653 0.0617 0.0364 0.0563 0.0308 0.0439 0.0784 0.0831 0.0055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0525 0.0477 0.0126 0.0243 0.0291 0.0063 0.2960 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3258 0.0441 0.0153 0.0000 0.0047 0.0000 0.0000 0.0178 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0433 0.0187 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 0 0.0311 0.0267 0.0432 0.1205 0.0792 0.0496 0.0415 0.0323 0.0369 0.0280 0.0294 0.0256 0.0354 0.0233 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000
52 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1237 0.0692 0.0415 0.0309 0.0271 0.0278 0.0285 0.0277 0.0253 0.0377 0.0306 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0702 0.0424 0.0349 0.0367 0.0455 0.0313 0.0499 0.0359 0.0215 0.1273 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0773 0.0510 0.0356 0.0324 0.0574 0.0629 0.0402 0.0403 0.0000 0.3976 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0988 0.1324 0.0317 0.1340 0.1493 0.0341 0.1100 0.0214 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2517 0.0335 0.0000 0.0000 0.0067 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 0 0.0350 0.0290 0.0461 0.1368 0.0758 0.0570 0.0412 0.0388 0.0351 0.0271 0.0277 0.0308 0.0317 0.0794 0.0074 0.0000 0.0000
53 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1371 0.0887 0.0549 0.0342 0.0298 0.0325 0.0300 0.0306 0.0261 0.0317 0.0015 0.0109 0.0000 0.0000
53 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0531 0.0483 0.0445 0.0440 0.0330 0.0244 0.0444 0.0396 0.0648 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0421 0.0639 0.0430 0.0244 0.0191 0.0226 0.0423 0.0474 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1150 0.0722 0.0264 0.1497 0.0246 0.0141 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9785 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
54 0 0.0378 0.0341 0.0477 0.1422 0.0913 0.0575 0.0480 0.0430 0.0396 0.0361 0.0314 0.0304 0.0304 0.0307 0.0508 0.0000 0.0000
54 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1567 0.1010 0.0560 0.0393 0.0380 0.0363 0.0343 0.0311 0.0308 0.0392 0.0444 0.0236 0.0000 0.0000
54 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4090 0.0919 0.0587 0.0415 0.0417 0.0353 0.0435 0.0450 0.0486 0.0207 0.0268 0.0175 0.0000 0.0000
54 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1033 0.0853 0.0532 0.0449 0.0372 0.0368 0.0476 0.0712 0.0185 0.0171 0.0070 0.0000 0.0000
54 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1748 0.1233 0.0513 0.1202 0.0393 0.0755 0.0372 0.1355 0.0404 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
54 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0122 0.0000 0.3772 0.0000 0.0744 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
60 0 0.0938 0.0763 0.1021 0.1809 0.1576 0.1140 0.0972 0.0719 0.0821 0.0784 0.0657 0.0356 0.0495 0.0292 0.1493 0.0000 0.0000
60 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1988 0.1634 0.1450 0.1031 0.0786 0.0741 0.0851 0.0692 0.0581 0.0294 0.0244 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000
60 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1458 0.1372 0.0917 0.0766 0.1008 0.0903 0.0454 0.0738 0.0672 0.0079 0.0486 0.0000 0.0000
60 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1575 0.1570 0.1236 0.1145 0.1728 0.0967 0.1671 0.0880 0.0894 0.0266 0.0075 0.0000 0.0000
60 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2439 0.1769 0.2006 0.1243 0.1546 0.1648 0.0746 0.0385 0.0879 0.0515 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000
60 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0809 0.1363 0.2725 0.2433 0.1688 0.5070 0.1551 0.0000 0.0560 0.0955 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
70 0 0.0656 0.0538 0.0856 0.0999 0.0706 0.0523 0.0273 0.0407 0.0325 0.0334 0.0361 0.0343 0.0264 0.0246 0.0233 0.0240 0.0259
70 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1059 0.0819 0.0566 0.0489 0.0403 0.0361 0.0393 0.0312 0.0332 0.0270 0.0249 0.0278 0.0238 0.0305
70 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0668 0.1271 0.0760 0.0445 0.0366 0.0395 0.0304 0.0327 0.0260 0.0233 0.0231 0.0197 0.0223
70 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1263 0.0485 0.0292 0.0525 0.0346 0.0299 0.0408 0.0291 0.0233 0.0276 0.0185 0.0243
70 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1293 0.2109 0.0814 0.0956 0.0833 0.0425 0.0293 0.0314 0.0246 0.0173 0.0250 0.0168
70 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0337 0.0011 0.0494 0.0677 0.0188 0.0255 0.0171 0.0223 0.0130
81 0 0.0542 0.0499 0.0651 0.1517 0.1081 0.0771 0.0620 0.0593 0.0545 0.0534 0.0536 0.0383 0.0407 0.0656 0.0895 0.0000 0.0000
81 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1556 0.1050 0.0708 0.0637 0.0585 0.0523 0.0576 0.0527 0.0373 0.0416 0.0661 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
81 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2770 0.0956 0.0743 0.0619 0.0597 0.0583 0.0706 0.0598 0.0439 0.0425 0.0824 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000
81 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1391 0.1098 0.0948 0.0623 0.0612 0.0793 0.1054 0.0679 0.0794 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
81 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0764 0.1167 0.1252 0.0956 0.0958 0.1187 0.0832 0.0515 0.0523 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
81 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0936 0.1559 0.0817 0.0640 0.1562 0.0467 0.0133 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
99 0 0.0856 0.0858 0.0968 0.1710 0.1340 0.1203 0.1190 0.1196 0.1150 0.0978 0.1279 0.1398 0.1179 0.1343 0.1841 0.0000 0.0000
99 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1647 0.1537 0.1198 0.1061 0.1030 0.1106 0.1251 0.1225 0.1008 0.0610 0.0831 0.0348 0.0000 0.0000
99 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1324 0.1148 0.1000 0.1237 0.1452 0.1444 0.1126 0.1467 0.2001 0.0471 0.0372 0.0000 0.0000
99 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.1482 0.1388 0.1556 0.1476 0.0920 0.1900 0.1687 0.1147 0.0793 0.1256 0.0000 0.0000
99 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1331 0.1399 0.1044 0.1282 0.1053 0.1088 0.2125 0.1717 0.1866 0.1278 0.0072 0.0000 0.0000
99 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0725 0.3889 0.1884 0.0323 0.0801 0.2117 0.0285 0.9341 0.0272 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table A2.
Standard errors of relative risk premium in the 2000–2004 income panel data with  = 3, by age, 
education level (6 levels) and socio-economic status (18 classes).
Soc. Ed. 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–89
10 0 0.0040 0.0033 0.0042 0.0109 0.0327 0.0165 0.0151 0.0119 0.0102 0.0066 0.0055 0.0071 0.0105 0.0151 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0291 0.0191 0.0099 0.0057 0.0048 0.0049 0.0057 0.0054 0.0099 0.0114 0.0086 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0672 0.0123 0.0105 0.0109 0.0106 0.0167 0.0148 0.0223 0.0522 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0363 0.0302 0.0148 0.0181 0.0180 0.0213 0.0221 0.0640 0.0264 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0359 0.0230 0.0410 0.0399 0.0911 0.0567 0.0115 0.0444 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
21 0 0.0030 0.0027 0.0033 0.0097 0.0185 0.0156 0.0097 0.0096 0.0072 0.0056 0.0051 0.0060 0.0081 0.0112 0.0437 0.0000 0.0000
21 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0383 0.0117 0.0080 0.0049 0.0045 0.0044 0.0044 0.0051 0.0064 0.0120 0.0340 0.0044 0.0000 0.0000
21 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0199 0.0189 0.0100 0.0074 0.0077 0.0069 0.0097 0.0129 0.0127 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
21 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0418 0.0357 0.0194 0.0155 0.0173 0.0163 0.0129 0.0186 0.0226 0.0095 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
21 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0188 0.0194 0.0113 0.0127 0.0097 0.0118 0.0274 0.0408 0.0553 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
21 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0912 0.0254 0.0298 0.0903 0.0269 0.0261 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
31 0 0.0028 0.0025 0.0031 0.0117 0.0594 0.0217 0.0280 0.0257 0.0278 0.0135 0.0091 0.0105 0.0252 0.0000 0.1365 0.0000 0.0000
31 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0527 0.0281 0.0086 0.0122 0.0088 0.0077 0.0063 0.0079 0.0054 0.0181 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
31 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1171 0.0056 0.0085 0.0035 0.0068 0.0038 0.0040 0.0046 0.0053 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
31 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0194 0.0128 0.0052 0.0025 0.0038 0.0041 0.0034 0.0035 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
31 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0964 0.0102 0.0044 0.0037 0.0028 0.0024 0.0028 0.0042 0.0043 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
31 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0109 0.0614 0.0087 0.0061 0.0202 0.0086 0.0047 0.0117 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 0 0.0016 0.0016 0.0027 0.0108 0.0361 0.0316 0.0396 0.0412 0.0322 0.0204 0.0136 0.0162 0.0043 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0536 0.0069 0.0067 0.0071 0.0029 0.0068 0.0036 0.0057 0.0112 0.0069 0.0236 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0099 0.0067 0.0049 0.0029 0.0025 0.0059 0.0072 0.0045 0.0084 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0071 0.0024 0.0022 0.0027 0.0017 0.0026 0.0037 0.0030 0.0065 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0231 0.0041 0.0033 0.0032 0.0031 0.0039 0.0027 0.0028 0.0051 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
32 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0148 0.0047 0.0096 0.0070 0.0064 0.0169 0.0143 0.0241 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
33 0 0.0019 0.0016 0.0026 0.0115 0.0357 0.0351 0.0145 0.0181 0.0074 0.0092 0.0188 0.0075 0.0088 0.0050 0.0381 0.0000 0.0000
33 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0294 0.0083 0.0081 0.0086 0.0078 0.0087 0.0071 0.0089 0.0154 0.0084 0.0134 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000
33 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0137 0.0087 0.0053 0.0058 0.0048 0.0058 0.0044 0.0042 0.0082 0.0138 0.0037 0.0000 0.0000
33 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0109 0.0060 0.0037 0.0025 0.0021 0.0024 0.0022 0.0030 0.0080 0.0047 0.0597 0.0000 0.0000
33 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0236 0.0032 0.0026 0.0021 0.0023 0.0025 0.0030 0.0029 0.0063 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
33 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0205 0.0194 0.0067 0.0071 0.0043 0.0101 0.0047 0.0119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
34 0 0.0024 0.0020 0.0032 0.0122 0.0258 0.0242 0.0261 0.0066 0.0129 0.0113 0.0111 0.0093 0.0108 0.0028 0.0348 0.0000 0.0000
34 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0353 0.0120 0.0090 0.0057 0.0049 0.0063 0.0079 0.0075 0.0053 0.0305 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
34 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 0.0074 0.0069 0.0054 0.0028 0.0040 0.0032 0.0038 0.0043 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
34 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0184 0.0090 0.0071 0.0073 0.0037 0.0036 0.0041 0.0045 0.0060 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
34 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0129 0.0040 0.0032 0.0039 0.0023 0.0025 0.0039 0.0032 0.0047 0.0080 0.0762 0.0000 0.0000
34 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0044 0.0215 0.0095 0.0115 0.0110 0.0130 0.0239 0.0168 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
41 0 0.0015 0.0015 0.0021 0.0088 0.0260 0.0138 0.0134 0.0049 0.0043 0.0051 0.0029 0.0028 0.0117 0.0121 0.0151 0.0000 0.0000
41 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0402 0.0076 0.0056 0.0036 0.0030 0.0029 0.0029 0.0031 0.0029 0.0065 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
41 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0085 0.0035 0.0021 0.0021 0.0018 0.0014 0.0017 0.0031 0.0042 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
41 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0086 0.0054 0.0050 0.0034 0.0025 0.0053 0.0050 0.0055 0.0047 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
41 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0249 0.0062 0.0048 0.0047 0.0135 0.0101 0.0080 0.0084 0.0098 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
41 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0195 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0388 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 0 0.0016 0.0013 0.0019 0.0050 0.0067 0.0070 0.0041 0.0042 0.0027 0.0021 0.0015 0.0019 0.0026 0.0207 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000
42 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0092 0.0027 0.0027 0.0021 0.0019 0.0020 0.0017 0.0020 0.0017 0.0044 0.0139 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0023 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0018 0.0017 0.0028 0.0044 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0085 0.0038 0.0070 0.0066 0.0073 0.0045 0.0062 0.0049 0.0111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0296 0.0053 0.0047 0.0045 0.0057 0.0083 0.0082 0.0077 0.0106 0.0048 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
42 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0173 0.0041 0.0278 0.0293 0.0473 0.0011 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 0 0.0050 0.0055 0.0070 0.0133 0.0210 0.0133 0.0103 0.0071 0.0079 0.0041 0.0046 0.0043 0.0082 0.0147 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0211 0.0065 0.0059 0.0057 0.0079 0.0045 0.0052 0.0045 0.0060 0.0096 0.0346 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0169 0.0065 0.0047 0.0036 0.0053 0.0050 0.0040 0.0062 0.0133 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0305 0.0248 0.0098 0.0062 0.0163 0.0190 0.0352 0.0744 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0203 0.0213 0.0304 0.0124 0.0236 0.0066 0.0178 0.0210 0.0159 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
43 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Soc. Ed. 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–89
44 0 0.0018 0.0013 0.0023 0.0072 0.0138 0.0130 0.0083 0.0040 0.0031 0.0035 0.0028 0.0032 0.0037 0.0150 0.0071 0.0000 0.0000
44 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160 0.0040 0.0027 0.0021 0.0014 0.0015 0.0013 0.0015 0.0020 0.0057 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
44 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0060 0.0025 0.0023 0.0015 0.0017 0.0020 0.0021 0.0033 0.0066 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
44 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0081 0.0038 0.0060 0.0050 0.0086 0.0070 0.0082 0.0068 0.0144 0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
44 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0231 0.0131 0.0165 0.0067 0.0286 0.0294 0.0249 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
44 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0053 0.0328 0.0018 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 0 0.0039 0.0039 0.0085 0.0130 0.0202 0.0147 0.0220 0.0046 0.0130 0.0100 0.0081 0.0061 0.0224 0.0538 0.0076 0.0000 0.0000
51 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0187 0.0094 0.0078 0.0054 0.0036 0.0035 0.0034 0.0049 0.0064 0.0088 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0404 0.0180 0.0116 0.0317 0.0080 0.0085 0.0526 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0183 0.0216 0.0074 0.0000 0.0162 0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0039 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
51 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 0 0.0007 0.0007 0.0016 0.0045 0.0045 0.0029 0.0032 0.0024 0.0022 0.0014 0.0013 0.0012 0.0045 0.0058 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000
52 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 0.0018 0.0014 0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0012 0.0015 0.0045 0.0131 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0102 0.0045 0.0048 0.0050 0.0080 0.0041 0.0091 0.0058 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0132 0.0068 0.0070 0.0059 0.0162 0.0166 0.0122 0.0214 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0466 0.0458 0.0090 0.0611 0.0735 0.0137 0.0551 0.0090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
52 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1741 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 0 0.0017 0.0015 0.0030 0.0070 0.0066 0.0059 0.0044 0.0042 0.0038 0.0017 0.0020 0.0029 0.0042 0.0367 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0115 0.0031 0.0029 0.0018 0.0017 0.0020 0.0013 0.0024 0.0027 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0098 0.0077 0.0085 0.0066 0.0054 0.0037 0.0117 0.0102 0.0321 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0045 0.0095 0.0152 0.0090 0.0062 0.0081 0.0122 0.0207 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0438 0.0281 0.0066 0.1072 0.0122 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
53 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
54 0 0.0011 0.0011 0.0020 0.0038 0.0050 0.0040 0.0032 0.0030 0.0020 0.0018 0.0013 0.0017 0.0021 0.0050 0.0070 0.0000 0.0000
54 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0072 0.0023 0.0020 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0012 0.0013 0.0021 0.0053 0.0134 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000
54 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0125 0.0050 0.0030 0.0040 0.0034 0.0055 0.0070 0.0086 0.0059 0.0072 0.0098 0.0000 0.0000
54 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0256 0.0162 0.0129 0.0107 0.0134 0.0123 0.0195 0.0256 0.0057 0.0012 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000
54 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0772 0.0498 0.0120 0.0579 0.0166 0.0313 0.0096 0.0404 0.0096 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
54 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
60 0 0.0047 0.0053 0.0093 0.0017 0.0060 0.0091 0.0119 0.0082 0.0134 0.0127 0.0098 0.0096 0.0151 0.0239 0.0996 0.0000 0.0000
60 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 0.0019 0.0041 0.0059 0.0069 0.0072 0.0104 0.0110 0.0198 0.0147 0.0126 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
60 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0118 0.0077 0.0087 0.0095 0.0141 0.0194 0.0106 0.0201 0.0503 0.0033 0.0214 0.0000 0.0000
60 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0148 0.0119 0.0218 0.0218 0.0358 0.0320 0.0409 0.0377 0.0276 0.0145 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000
60 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0449 0.0176 0.0293 0.0213 0.0476 0.0426 0.0257 0.0169 0.0560 0.0312 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
60 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0219 0.1406 0.0912 0.0695 0.3483 0.0299 0.0000 0.0000 0.0670 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
70 0 0.0063 0.0044 0.0058 0.0083 0.0108 0.0083 0.0035 0.0051 0.0031 0.0024 0.0018 0.0012 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008
70 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0338 0.0130 0.0078 0.0056 0.0042 0.0031 0.0031 0.0018 0.0017 0.0009 0.0009 0.0012 0.0014 0.0024
70 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0330 0.0355 0.0232 0.0117 0.0057 0.0055 0.0039 0.0036 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0019 0.0024
70 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0427 0.0354 0.0198 0.0222 0.0069 0.0061 0.0060 0.0023 0.0022 0.0032 0.0028 0.0049
70 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1107 0.0200 0.0366 0.0240 0.0121 0.0051 0.0030 0.0023 0.0021 0.0041 0.0029
70 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0208 0.0003 0.0225 0.0310 0.0039 0.0065 0.0049 0.0066 0.0076
81 0 0.0021 0.0020 0.0027 0.0068 0.0055 0.0042 0.0035 0.0034 0.0027 0.0028 0.0022 0.0013 0.0027 0.0420 0.0439 0.0000 0.0000
81 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0029 0.0026 0.0027 0.0025 0.0020 0.0023 0.0022 0.0015 0.0051 0.0435 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
81 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0088 0.0064 0.0047 0.0042 0.0052 0.0055 0.0055 0.0035 0.0059 0.0482 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
81 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0117 0.0130 0.0139 0.0135 0.0071 0.0111 0.0173 0.0104 0.0225 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
81 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0197 0.0127 0.0172 0.0146 0.0171 0.0256 0.0188 0.0073 0.0102 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
81 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0334 0.1075 0.0334 0.0361 0.0611 0.0169 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
99 0 0.0032 0.0050 0.0059 0.0066 0.0075 0.0125 0.0132 0.0139 0.0145 0.0110 0.0121 0.0156 0.0171 0.0206 0.0270 0.0000 0.0000
99 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 0.0040 0.0091 0.0096 0.0097 0.0113 0.0119 0.0126 0.0155 0.0166 0.0553 0.0171 0.0000 0.0000
99 5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0217 0.0165 0.0141 0.0175 0.0227 0.0223 0.0200 0.0323 0.0695 0.0379 0.0150 0.0000 0.0000
99 6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0317 0.0284 0.0315 0.0492 0.0437 0.0288 0.0465 0.0523 0.0700 0.0631 0.0885 0.0000 0.0000
99 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0705 0.0301 0.0199 0.0262 0.0277 0.0403 0.0472 0.0488 0.0857 0.0729 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
99 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0404 0.2004 0.0797 0.0114 0.0191 0.1758 0.0124 0.0000 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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The Finnish Centre for Pensions is a statutory co-operation body, 
expert and producer of joint services for the development and 
implementation of earnings-related pension provision.
 The aim of our research is to produce high-quality, widely 
applicable information for the evaluation and development 
of pension provision.
Eläketurvakeskus on työeläketurvan kehittämisen ja 
toimeenpanon lakisääteinen yhteistyöelin, asiantuntija 
ja yhteisten palveluiden tuottaja. Tutkimustoiminnan tavoitteena 
on tuottaa korkeatasoista ja laajasti hyödynnettävää tietoa 
eläketurvan arvioimiseen ja kehittämiseen.
Pensionsskyddscentralen är ett lagstadgat samorgan 
och sakkunnig inom verkställigheten och utvecklingen 
av arbetspensionsskyddet. Vi producerar gemensamma tjänster 
för arbetspensionssystemet. Vår forskning har som mål att ta 
fram högklassig information som nyttiggörs på bred front vid 
bedömningen och utvecklingen av pensionsskyddet.
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